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 Without Authority:  The Logan Act
Summary
The Logan Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 953, states:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without
authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any
correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or
agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States,
or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his
agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury
which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or
subjects.
The Logan Act was intended to prohibit United States citizens without authority
from interfering in relations between the United States and foreign governments.
There appear to have been no prosecutions under the Act in its more than 200 year
history.  However, there have been a number of judicial references to the Act, and it
is not uncommon for it to be used as a point of challenge concerning dealings with
foreign officials.  Although attempts have been made to repeal the Act, it remains law
and at least a potential sanction to be used against anyone who without authority
interferes in the foreign relations of the United States.
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Conducting Foreign Relations
 Without Authority:  The Logan Act
Introduction
The Logan Act, designed to cover relations between private citizens of the
United States and foreign governments, has prompted much controversy as to its
scope and effect in its more than 200 years.  Described as either a “paper dragon or
sleeping giant” by one commentator, proclaimed to be possibly unconstitutional by
others, it represents a combination of legal and policy factors in both domestic and
international concerns.
As amended, the Act states:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without
authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any
correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or
agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States,
or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his
agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury
which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or
subjects.1
In 1994 the fine was changed from $5,000 to “under this title.”2  Otherwise, there do
not appear to have been any substantial changes in the Act since its original
enactment on January 30, 1799, as 1 Stat. 613.
History of the Logan Act
After the French Revolution, difficulties developed between the Federalist
Administration of the United States and the various revolutionary governments of
France.3 Because the United States had not assisted the French revolutionaries to
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in Foreign Affairs, 36 EMORY L.J. 285 (1987); Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or
Sleeping Giant?, 60 A.J.I.L. 268 (1966); and Warren, History of Laws Prohibiting
Correspondence with a Foreign Government and Acceptance of a Commission, S. Doc. No.
696, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917).
4 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 267 (Richardson ed., 1897).
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their satisfaction and because the United States had ratified the Jay Treaty with Great
Britain, the French government authorized plunderings of American merchant ships.
In 1797 President Adams sent John Marshall, Charles C. Pinckney, and Elbridge
Gerry as special envoys to France to negotiate and settle claims and causes of
differences which existed between the French Directory and the United States.  This
mission resulted in the XYZ letters controversy, and its failure led to such strong
anti-France feelings in the United States that preparations for war were begun by the
Congress.
After the unsuccessful envoys returned from France, Dr. George Logan, a
Philadelphia Quaker, a doctor, and a Republican, decided to attempt on his own to
settle the controversies.  Bearing a private certificate of citizenship from his friend,
Thomas Jefferson, who at the time was Vice President, Logan sailed for France on
June 12, 1798.  In France he was hailed by the newspapers as the envoy of peace and
was received by Talleyrand.  The French Directory, having concluded that it was
politically wise to relax tensions with the United States, issued a decree raising the
embargo on American merchant ships and freed American ships and seamen.
Logan, however, received a less friendly response from the United States after
he returned.  Secretary of State Pickering told him that the French decree was
illusory.  General Washington expressed his disapproval of Logan’s actions.
President Adams recommended that Congress take action to stop the “temerity and
impertinence of individuals affecting to interfere in public affairs between France and
the United States.”4 Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut introduced a
resolution in Congress to prevent actions similar to Logan’s:
Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of
amending the act entitled “An act in addition to the act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States,” so far as to extend the penalties, if need
be, to all persons, citizens of the United States, who shall usurp the Executive
authority of this Government, by commencing or carrying on any correspondence
with the Governments of any foreign prince or state, relating to controversies or
disputes which do or shall exist between such prince or state, and the United
States.5
The resolution was passed, and the committee was appointed.  On January 7, 1799,
Griswold introduced in the House a bill based on the resolution:
Be it enacted, etc., that if any person, being a citizen of the United States,
or in any foreign country, shall, without the permission or authority of the
Government of the United States, directly or indirectly, commence or carry on
any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse with any foreign
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Government, or any officer or agent thereof, relating to any dispute or
controversy between any foreign Government and the United States, with an
intent to influence the measures or conduct of the Government having disputes
or controversies with the United States, as aforesaid; or of any person, being a
citizen of or resident within, the United States, and not duly authorized shall
counsel, advise, aid or assist, in any such correspondence with intent as
aforesaid, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor; and, on
conviction before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding — thousand dollars, and by imprisonment
during a term not less than — months, not exceeding — years.6
The bill was debated at length, and various amendments were proposed, some of
which passed and some of which did not.  The House of Representatives passed the
bill on January 17, 1799, and the Senate passed it on January 25, 1799.  It was signed
and became a law on January 30, 1799.
Judicial References to the Logan Act
There appear to have been few indictments under the Logan Act.7 The one
indictment found occurred in 1803 when a grand jury indicted Francis Flournoy, a
Kentucky farmer, who wrote an article in the FRANKFORT GUARDIAN OF FREEDOM
under the pen name of “A Western American.”  Flournoy advocated in the article a
separate Western nation allied to France.  The United States Attorney for Kentucky,
an Adams appointee and brother-in-law of Chief Justice Marshall, went no further
than procuring the indictment of Flournoy, and the purchase of the Louisiana
Territory later that year appeared to cause the separatism issue to become obsolete.
So far as can be determined, there have been no prosecutions under the Logan
Act.  However, there have been a number of judicial references to the Act, among
which are the following.
Judge Sprague of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts mentioned
the Logan Act in two charges that he made to grand juries during the Civil War.  On
October 18, 1861, he said:
There are other defenses to which our attention is called by the present
condition of our country.  A few months since a member of the British
parliament declared, in the most public manner, that he had received many letters
from the Northern states of America urging parliament to acknowledge the
independence of the Southern confederacy.  Such an announcement ought to
arrest the attention of grand juries; for if any such communication has been made
by a citizen of the United States, it is a high misdemeanor.  St. 1799, c. 1. (1 Stat.
613) was especially designed to prevent such unwarrantable interference with the
diplomacy and purposes of our government.8
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In the second grand jury charge referring to the Logan Act, made in 1863, Judge
Sprague stated:
We have seen it stated in such form as to arrest attention, that unauthorized
individuals have entered into communication with members of parliament and
foreign ministers and officers in order to influence their conduct, in controversies
with the United States, or to defeat the measures of our government.  It ought to
be known that such acts have been long prohibited by law.9
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.10 referred to the Logan Act as
follows:
No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law
that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat
some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law and keep to
some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive [citations omitted].
They go further, at times, and declare that they will punish anyone, subject or
not, who shall do certain things if they can catch him, as in the case of pirates on
the high seas.  In cases immediately affecting national interests they may go
further still and may make, and, if they get the chance, execute similar threats as
to acts done within another recognized jurisdiction.  An illustration from our
statutes is found with regard to criminal correspondence with foreign
governments.  Rev. Stat., § 5335.11
Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 5212 was  a case charging a union member
with betraying the interests of his union at the time of negotiation between the union
and a railroad during a labor dispute.  The court compared the union’s reaction
toward the act of its member with Congress’s feelings at the time of enactment of the
Logan Act.
[T]he plaintiff’s conduct is characterized as “traitorous,” and it is said that he has
committed “moral perjury.”  This is strong language; but there is no reason to
question that it is really meant, and that those responsible for its use believe it to
be fully justified.  The truth doubtless is that to them the Brotherhood and the
roads appear to be almost distinct sovereignties.  At a time when it is at grip with
the companies, for a member to let one of the latter sue in his name, for the
purpose of preventing the use by it of one of its most efficient means of warfare,
does to them seem treasonable.  Within the limits of their power, they are
determined to punish any such proceeding.  They feel about it as did Congress
when in 1799 it enacted the so-called Logan Act...making it a crime for any
citizen to have intercourse with a foreign government with intent to defeat the
measures of his own.13
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United States v. Bryan14refers to 18 U.S.C. § 5, which is the predecessor of 18
U.S.C. § 953:
That the subject of un-American and subversive activities is within the
investigating power of the Congress is obvious.  Conceivably, information in this
field may aid the Congress in legislating concerning any one of many matters,
such as correspondence with foreign governments....15
United States v. Peace Information Center16held that Congress had the power
to enact the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 under its inherent power to
regulate external affairs as well as under its constitutional power to legislate
concerning national defense and that the Act is not subject to any constitutional
infirmity.  The court mentioned similarities between the Logan Act and the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, and the language used appears to indicate that the Logan
Act, like the Foreign Agents Registration Act, is constitutional.
Citizens of the United States are forbidden to carry on correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government with an intent to influence its measures
or conduct in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States.
The Act under scrutiny in this case represents the converse of the last
mentioned statute.  The former deals with citizens of the United States who
attempt to conduct correspondence with foreign governments.  The latter affects
agents of foreign principals who carry on certain specified activities in the
United States.  Both matters are equally within the field of external affairs of this
country, and, therefore, within the inherent regulatory power of the Congress.17
In Martin v. Young,18 which concerned a petition for habeas corpus by a
serviceman awaiting trial by a general court martial, the principal issue was whether
the petitioner could be tried in a civil court for the offense charged against him by the
Army.  A part of the specification stated:
[That petitioner while interned in a North Korean prisoner of war camp,
did] without proper authority, wrongfully, unlawfully, and knowingly
collaborate, communicate and hold intercourse, directly and indirectly, with the
enemy by joining with, participating in, and leading discussion groups and
classes conducted by the enemy reflecting views and opinions that the United
Nations and the United States were illegal aggressors in the Korean conflict....19
The court stated that the conduct described in the specification violated at least three
criminal statutes under which the petitioner could be tried in a civil court, one of
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which was the Logan Act, and granted the petition.  However, the Department of
Justice did not prosecute Martin under the Logan Act.
Pennsylvania v. Nelson20 held that the Smith Act,21 which prohibits the knowing
advocacy of the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence,
supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the
same conduct.  The reason given for the pre-emption is that the federal statutes touch
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system must be
assured to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.  The Court
mentioned that “[s]tates are barred by the Constitution from entering into treaties and
by 18 U.S.C. § 953 from correspondence or intercourse with foreign governments
with relation to their disputes or controversies with this Nation.”22
Briehl v. Dulles23upheld certain Department of State regulations which provided
that no passport shall be issued to members of the Communist Party.  The court
referred to other valid federal statutes which restrict persons in the area of foreign
relations:
We have statutes dealing with persons who act as agents of a foreign
government, or those who have “correspondence” with a foreign government
with intent to influence its measures in relation to disputes or controversies with
our Government or to defeat the measures of the United States.24
In Waldron v. British Petroleum Co.25the plaintiff sued for triple damages under
the Clayton Act for alleged conspiracy of the defendants to prevent the importation
and sale by the plaintiff of Iranian oil.  The defendants asserted that the plaintiff had
obtained his contract through a series of violations of criminal statutes including the
Logan Act.  The court held that, in order to maintain this defense, the defendants
would have to show that the plaintiff sought to thwart some clearly and
unequivocally asserted policy measures of the United States instead of merely
statements of opinion, attitude, and belief of government officials.  The defendants
were unable to show this.  Further, the court noted that:
Another infirmity in defendants’ claim that plaintiff violated the Logan Act
is the existence of a doubtful question with regard to the constitutionality of that
statute [Logan Act] under the Sixth Amendment.  That doubt is engendered by
the statute’s use of the vague and indefinite terms, “defeat” and “measures”
[citation omitted].  Neither of these words is an abstraction of common certainty
or possesses a definite statutory or judicial definition.
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Since, however, there are other grounds for disposing of this motion, it is
not necessary to decide the constitutional question.  Furthermore, any “ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of lenity” [citation omitted].26
The court also indicates that, although Congress should perhaps eliminate the
vagueness of the Logan Act, the Act remains valid despite the lack of prosecutions
under it.
The Court finds no merit in plaintiff’s argument that the Logan Act has
been abrogated by desuetude.  From the absence of reported cases, one may
deduce that the statute has not been called into play because no factual situation
requiring its invocation has been presented to the courts.  Cf. Shakespeare,
MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene ii (“The law hath not been dead, though
it hath slept.”)
It may, however, be appropriate for the Court (Canons of Judicial Ethics,
Judicial Canon 23) to invite Congressional attention to the possible need for
amendment of Title 18 U.S.C. § 953 to eliminate this problem by using more
precise words than “defeat” and “measures” and, at the same time, using
language paralleling that now in § 954.27
United States v. Elliot28also refers to the Logan Act and reaffirms the statute as
it is discussed in Waldron:
Pertinent, too, is Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., [citation omitted]
wherein this court held vital a previously unenforced section of the Logan Act
(18 U.S.C. § 953) promulgated in 1799.29
In Agee v. Muskie30suit was brought to revoke Agee’s passport on the basis that
his activities abroad were causing serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the United States.  In the Appendix to the case there are comments on
various specific laws which Agee had allegedly violated.  One of these was the Logan
Act.
Agee is quoted as stating that “in recent weeks” prior to December 23, 1979
he proposed to the “militants” in Iran (who obviously under 18 U.S.C. § 11 are
a “faction and body of insurgents” constituting a “foreign government”) that they
should compel the United States to “exchange...the C.I.A.’s files on its
operations in Iran since 1950 for the Captive Americans” [citation omitted].
Such conduct violates 18 U.S.C. § 953 which prohibits any citizen of the United
States from carrying on correspondence or intercourse with any foreign
government (the Iranian terrorist faction) “with intent to influence [its] measures
or conduct or [that] of any...agent thereof [footnote omitted].  Agee’s violation
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of this act with the Terrorists is self evident from his own uncontradicted
statement.31
In ITT World Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission32the court found that the lower court had misread ITT’s complaint
concerning violation of the Logan Act.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a party has standing to secure
judicial review of any “agency action” that causes a “legal wrong” [footnote
omitted].  The district court held that ITT has not suffered a legal wrong, reading
its complaint solely to allege a violation of the Logan Act’s prohibition of
unauthorized negotiation with foreign governments [footnote omitted].  Because
only the Department of State is aggrieved by violations of that criminal statute,
the court reasoned, ITT’s alleged injury is not legally cognizable.
We respectfully conclude that the district court misread ITT’s complaint.
The gravamen of ITT’s allegation is quite specific:  “The activities of the
FCC...are unlawful and ultra vires, and in excess of the authority conferred on
the Commission by the Communications Act” [footnote omitted].  Whether the
complaint’s two references to the Logan Act [footnote omitted] should be
construed as an attempt to state  a separate cause of action (as the Commission
insists) or as mere illustrative matter not intended to assert a claim (as ITT
argues), a cause of action under the Communications Act has clearly been
alleged.33
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.,34
suit was brought to determine whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196435
applied extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of United States employers
who employed United States citizens abroad.  The Court, in its holding that there was
not sufficient evidence to indicate that the Act was intended to apply abroad, stated:
Congress’ awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies
overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has
expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute.  See, e.g.,...the
Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (applying Act to “any citizen...wherever he may
be...”).36
United States v. DeLeon37 concerned whether 8 U.S.C. section 1326, which
makes it a crime for an alien who has been previously deported to enter, attempt to
enter, or be found in the United States unless certain conditions are met, applies to
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conduct occurring outside the United States.  In holding that the statute does apply
to conduct occurring outside the United States, the court stated:
More important, assuming that the Convention [Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone] also provides or ratifies a power to
regulate certain conduct within the contiguous zone, that has a substantial
adverse effect within the United States.  That power was assumed to exist well
before the Convention, e.g., Logan Act....38
In a series of reviews of a general court-martial, styled United States v.
Murphy,39 the appellant, who was charged with committing crimes abroad, urged the
Logan Act as a basis for his being denied effective assistance of counsel.
The appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
at a critical stage of the proceedings due to an erroneous interpretation of the
Logan Act....  The Logan Act prohibits unauthorized negotiation with a foreign
government....  In appellant’s case, the Federal Republic of Germany declined to
exercise criminal jurisdiction, in accordance with existing Status of Forces
Agreements [footnote omitted].  The appellant’s counsel decided, after personal
research and consultation with other military lawyers, that he was prohibited
from attempting to persuade the German authorities to exercise jurisdiction.  The
appellant now argues that his trial defense counsel’s failure to negotiate with the
Federal Republic of Germany, which does not allow capital punishment, denied
him effective assistance of counsel.  We disagree....40
Department of State References
A search of statements issued by the State Department concerning the Logan
Act from 1975 to the present has found two opinions in the DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, continued, beginning in 1980, with a
column in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.  In these instances the
Department did not consider the activities in question to be inconsistent with the
Logan Act.  One opinion concerned the questioning of certain activities of Senators
John Sparkman and George McGovern with respect to the government of Cuba.  The
Department stated:
The clear intent of this provision [Logan Act] is to prohibit unauthorized
persons from intervening in disputes between the United States and foreign
governments.  Nothing in section 953, however, would appear to restrict
members of the Congress from engaging in discussions with foreign officials in
pursuance of their legislative duties under the Constitution.  In the case of
Senators McGovern and Sparkman the executive branch, although it did not in
any way encourage the Senators to go to Cuba, was fully informed of the nature
and purpose of their visit, and had validated their passports for travel to that
country.
CRS-10
41 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, p. 750.
42 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1976, pp. 75-76.
Senator McGovern’s report of his discussions with Cuban officials states:
“I made it clear that I had no authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States
— that I had come to listen and learn....”  (Cuban Realities:  May 1975, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., August 1975).  Senator Sparkman’s contacts with Cuban
officials were conducted on a similar basis.  The specific issues raised by the
Senators (e.g., the Southern Airways case; Luis Tiant’s desire to have his parents
visit the United States) would, in any event, appear to fall within the second
paragraph of Section 953.
Accordingly, the Department does not consider the activities of Senators
Sparkman and McGovern to be inconsistent with the stipulations of Section
953.41
A 1976 statement by the Department of State concerned a letter written by
Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional
Relations, to Senator John V. Tunney in reply to a constituent’s inquiry about a visit
of former President Nixon to the People’s Republic of China.  The letter stated:
Mr. Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China was undertaken
entirely in his capacity as a private United States citizen.  In accordance with the
expressed wishes of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and as
a normal matter of comity between governments, the U.S. Government permitted
an aircraft from the People’s Republic of China to land in California in
connection with the visit.  Aside from activities related to the Chinese special
flights (including provision of an escort crew to insure safety of operations in
U.S. airspace), the U.S. Government’s role in the visit was limited to the
provision by the Secret Service of personal protective services, as required by
law, to the former President....
It is the responsibility of the Department of Justice to make determinations
of whether criminal statutes of this sort have been transgressed and whether
individuals should be prosecuted under them.  However, the Department of State
is unaware of any basis for believing that Mr. Nixon acted with the intent
prohibited by the Logan Act.  In this connection, it should be noted that no one
has ever been prosecuted under the Logan Act....42
In a number of instances, people have been alleged, often by political opponents,
to have violated the Logan Act.  For example, critics have suggested that Ross
Perot’s efforts to find missing American servicemen in Southeast Asia have violated
the Logan Act.  Critics alleged that former House Speaker Jim Wright violated the
Logan Act in his relations with the Sandinista government.  In 1984 while
campaigning for the Democratic nomination for President, Reverend Jesse Jackson
went to Syria to help in the release of a captured American military flyer and to Cuba
and Nicaragua.  The trips by Reverend Jackson occasioned comments from a number
of people, most notably from President Reagan, that Reverend Jackson had violated
the Logan Act.  Other private citizens, such as Jane Fonda, have made trips which
have been criticized as violative of the Logan Act, but there have apparently been no
official sanctions taken in any of these instances.
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Conclusion
Although it appears that there has never been a prosecution under the Logan
Act, there have been several judicial references to it, indicating that the Act has not
been forgotten and that it is at least a potential point of challenge that has been used
against anyone who without authority allegedly interferes in the foreign relations of
the United States.  There have been efforts to repeal the Act, one of the most
significant occurring in the late 1970’s.  For example, Senator Edward Kennedy
proposed in the 95th Congress to delete the Logan Act from the bill to amend the
United States criminal code.43 Senator James Allen insisted on reenacting the Act in
exchange for promising not to prolong debate over the bill, and Senator Kennedy
agreed to this.  However, since the House was unable to consider the criminal reform
bill in the 95th Congress, the possibility of deleting the Act in a conference
committee was eliminated.  It is possible, nevertheless, that the issue of whether the
Logan Act should remain will be considered by another Congress.
